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ARMS SALES AND THE MAJOR
WESTERN POWERS
Arthur Cyr*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Questions and issues associated with the arms trade, particularly sales from developed to less-developed nations, have become
increasingly visible in discussion among both specialists and the
general public. The strong public outcry which greeted the publicity about a $77 million Pentagon contract with the Vinnell Corporation of Southern California to train Saudi Arabian troops to
protect oil fields is symptomatic of the current mood. A special
subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has just
concluded far-reaching hearings on the international arms traffic
with intensive consideration of the American role. Congress has
become much more skeptical and suspicious of executive branch
independence in this policy area and has enacted legislation requiring congressional approval of any weapons sale over $7 million
and any servicing and secondary equipment transactions exceeding $25 million.' Congress has also determined that arms control
considerations must be applied to any arms transfers. It has been
increasingly difficult to secure congressional approval of weapons
sales, as several recent examples of congressional balking demon2
strate.
Large-scale arms sales took place in the past, but they did not
generate the same sort of concerned attention. To some extent, this
reflected the reluctance of governments to make arms trade information public. The understandable, automatic desire among the
buyers and sellers of weapons was to keep their transactions out
of the public eye. There was, as well, a comparative lack of public
* Program Director, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. B.A., 1966,
U.C.L.A.; M.A., 1967, U.C.L.A.; A.M., 1969, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1971,

Harvard University. Dennis Ross of the U.C.L.A. Arms Control Center provided
helpful advice for this article.
1. See, e.g., HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL SEcuRITY AssisTANCE AND ARMs EXPORT CONTROL AcT OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 94-1272, 94th Cong.,

2d Sess. 15 (1976).
2. Hearings on S. 795, S. 854, S. 1816, S. 2662, and S. Con. Res. 21 Before
the Subcomm. on ForeignAssistance of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
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interest in the subject. Thus, the relatively underpublicized weapons purchases simply did not create widespread interest and attention.
Various factors have doubtless played a role in focusing increased attention on arms traffic and the various technical, strategic, and political issues raised. In sheer value and volume, arms
traffic has escalated enormously in recent years. For example,
major weapons imports by Third World countries increased from
$220 million in 1950, to $880 million in 1960, and to $1,890 million
in 1972.1 With the dramatic growth in the volume of arms sales,
there have been striking changes in the characteristics and direction of the weapons flow. In earlier years, the bulk of weapons sold
were obsolete and war surplus materials. Presently, however, nations anxious to maintain their shares of the market are transferring the most modern weapons. Some weapons are being developed
exclusively for overseas sales. For example, the United States Government reportedly incurred expenditures of $112 million for development of the F-5E fighter, an aircraft that is of little interest
to the American military except as a marketable item overseas.
American weapons sales in recent years have been heavily concentrated in the three Middle Eastern countries of Iran, Israel, and
Saudi Arabia. Of $8.2 billion in equipment sold by the United
States abroad in 1974, more than $6.5 billion went to the Mideast;
about $4 billion went to Iran alone. Even greater amounts are
involved when account is taken of the advisory military personnel
and their dependents who are included in many arms deals, as for
example, in the recent F-14 sale to Iran.'
The possibility that the weapons transfers might facilitate and
encourage broader political commitment has also stimulated interest in the arms sales phenomenon, particularly in the United
States. The Vietnam experience has led to an acute awareness that
gradual involvement, undertaken without great publicity or
forethought, can lead to more serious commitments later on. Indirect economic and military aid to South Vietnam led to involve3. Most of the sales are made by four industrialized countries: the United
States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The United States is by far
the largest merchant, now accounting for about half of the annual overall global
sales of $20 billion. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, 320-21 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 SIPRI
YEARBOOK]. To some extent, the growth in sales has stemmed from the decline
in direct grant aid, mainly from Britain and the United States.
4. See note 2 supra.

Winter 1977]

ARMS SALES

ment in a costly conventional war.
The purpose of this essay is to discuss analytically the overseas
arms sales policies of the three major Western supplier nations-the United States, Britain, and France. It is appropriate to
group them together because they all have similar goals and characteristics. All are Atlantic Area NATO nations. They are democratic and are based upon largely private economies. The three
nations have general histories of cooperation and alliance dating
back to before the beginning of this century.
This analysis is based on the assumption that military trade
between the industrialized and lesser-developed countries is especially likely to destabilize international relations since (1) high
technology weapons in these areas have a greater impact, (2) political relationships are generally more fragile and uncertain both
within and between these countries, and (3) the likelihood of nuclear exchange does not operate as effectively as a restraint on
conventional warfare among Third World nations as among other
nations.
H-. INCENTIVES TO SELL

Generally, the multiple reasons encouraging the sale of arms
may be divided into two categories-incentives for the seller, and
incentives for the purchaser. For selling nations there are several
important factors that encourage heavy armaments sales overseas.
First, arms sales can improve a nation's overall economic situation, especially its balance of payments position. Although economists disagree about the importance of continued heavy payments
deficits, governments have consistently been concerned about
these deficits and the perceived need to maintain a favorable balance. The very unfavorable balances recently experienced by the
United States have created strong pressures to sell arms abroad.
Britain and France finance large portions of their defense budgets
with arms sales revenue. Though the United States may dwarf
other nations in the total amounts of arms sold, the smaller economies of these nations makes the arms trade comparatively more
important for them. One specialist recently observed, "France and
Britain especially have become heavily dependent upon export
sales for the survival of their defense industries. According to recent studies, the French aerospace industry exports over 50 per
cent of its output while British aerospace companies rely on ex-
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ports to absorb over 30 per cent of their output."'
Secondly, aside from the domestic economic considerations,
arms sales provide a method for maintaining and building international political influence through direct influence over the buyer.
Paradoxically, however, the process of selling arms to gain influence over other smaller countries also creates reciprocal limitations
on the seller. It becomes necessary for the seller to consider carefully whether a change in foreign policy will negatively affect the
relationship with the purchaser. Moreover, supplying arms opens
the possibility of embarrassment if the recipient is defeated, especially if this occurs at the hands of an opponent who is the customer of another major power.
For purchasing states there are also reasons for engaging in arms
sales. First, arms purchases can preserve regional power balances.
The danger that one small nation may gain hegemony or a dominant position in a region may be reduced by providing arms to the
other side. Secondly, it has been argued that selling conventional
arms prevents, or at least slows down, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons by inhibiting the drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
III.

NATIONAL POSITIONS AND POLICIES

This general theoretical outline of various policies is grounded
on a focused examination of the specific national experiences of the
United States, Britain, and France. There are some important
differences between these nations' arms sales policies even though
they are all NATO allies (at least in formal terms) and leading
arms sellers interested in improving their economic positions.
Arms are used as diplomatic tools, but how they are employed
varies greatly among the three countries. Significant differences
exist in regional distributions of arms.'
5.

Cahn, Have Arms, Will Sell, 4 ARMs CONTROL TODAY,

6.
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A. American Policies
In total amount of arms sold, the United States is far ahead of
the other nations, and this lead has been widening in recent years.
While all three nations may indeed be at the top of the list of arms
sellers, the United States is especially distinctive because of the
aggressiveness and success with which it has undertaken arms
sales. American arms sales have grown in the past eight years, not
as part of a conscious national design, but because the weapons are
available, profits are high, customers are eager, and income from
such sales helps the nation's international economic position.
These powerful influences encouraging sales are unopposed by
countervailing pressures for restraint or close supervision by the
government. In fiscal 1975, the United States Army spent more on
foreign military sales than on outfitting American troops-$1.9
billion for the former versus $1.1 billion for the latter.7
The United States has been led by various considerations to
channel arms into two particular regions of the world, the Middle
East and the Far East. In 1970 and 1971 approximately 65 per cent
of United States weapons exports to countries outside of the Atlantic Area went to the Middle East, notably to Iran and Israel. Likewise, in the early 1970s shipments to the Far East increased considerably, even if Vietnam aid is discounted. This trend partially
reflects the effort to implement the Nixon Doctrine,8 which declared that in the future other nations would be expected, if they
were attacked, to rely more on their own resources and very limited
American military aid, with far less likelihood of direct American
military engagement. Since this doctrine was not designed to apply
to Europe, the area of our strongest military commitment, the
most significant arena for its application has been the Far East.'
B. French Policies
For France, foreign policy grandeur under de Gaulle may have
required general international assertiveness, including arms sales
activity; but more broadly, French arms exports have been inU.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1966-1975 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).
7. Szulc, Kickback, 174 NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 1976, at 10.

8.

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ARMS TRADE

WITH THE THIRD WORLD,

153-54 (1971).

9. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST. Y.B. WORLD ARMAIENTS AND
DISARMAMENT, 103-04 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SIPRI YEARBOOK].
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creasing since at least 1950. Although the increase has not been as
prominent or dramatic as that in America, the French have had a
major impact. In 1970, for example, they exported early $1.3 billion
worth of military material. The bulk of the sales have been aeronautical products. This indicates the success the French have enjoyed in promoting the Mirage fighter.
French military exports during the post-war period have been
distributed globally. Before 1970, French sales were concentrated
in Africa and the Middle East. By the early 1970s, France was the
principal supplier of weapons to South Africa and Latin America.
French policy has been characterized by considerable imagination
in making weapons deals more attractive. For example, countries
in the Middle East have been offered arms arrangements that
include Pakistani, not French, technical assistance. Pakistan has
close links to the French aircraft industries and its involvement is
less embarrassing to the lesser developed countries."0
French arms export patterns are indicative of the broad, and
comparatively indiscriminate, character of the nation's foreign
policy outside of Europe. Though activity has been somewhat concentrated in the Middle East and Africa, it has hardly been limited
to these regions. No particular area of the globe has had a sufficiently strong grip on French policy long enough to bring about a
narrow regional concentration of the arms flow. This indicates,
among other things, the basic importance of Europe and the Atlantic Area to French policy. While President de Gaulle was involved
in numerous foreign policy efforts, principal attention was, after
all, devoted to gaining a greater measure of stature vis-A-vis the
United States and the Soviet Union, challenging the assumption
that either Britain or West Germany was the pivotal nation in
Western Europe, and exercising greater leadership within Europe
generally. As a result, attention was drawn away from potentially
close alliances with the less-developed countries. Moreover, the
efficient elimination of the remaining French colonial holdings
under de Gaulle left few binding political and military links with
the less-developed world.
C. British Policies
British arms sales have also reflected broader characteristics of
the nation's foreign policy. In comparison with France, Britain's
retreat from empire has been accompanied by more significant
10.

1973 SIPRI

YEARBOOK,

at 300-01.
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residual ties, often military in nature. The fact that commitments
have survived the termination of colonial relationships is testimony to the comparatively good rapport Britain has enjoyed with
most of the nations which once comprised the Empire and now
make up the Commonwealth. Furthermore, there has been a continuing British desire to maintain wide-ranging military commitments in the wake of a shrinking international political and economic role. British withdrawal of troops and abandonment of installations has been replaced by defense pacts and arms aid.
Partially similar to the pattern of United States arms sales, the
British trade has been concentrated in the Middle East. Britain's
decision to withdraw forces from positions east of the Suez as part
of the long post-war process of adjustment to a much reduced role
might have resulted in the substitution of other arms suppliers for
the British. Instead the transition led to increased British arms
sales to a number of states. British sales to Malaysia, Singapore,
and other parts of the Far East have increased. This has also been
the case in Africa and the Middle East, most significantly in Iran,
which has been receiving the largest volume, and also in the Arab
Peninsula. Consistent with the continuing alliance between Britain and the United States, and in reaction to the implications of
the former's withdrawal from the Mediterranean, there has been
some collaboration between the two countries in the arms field.
Beginning in 1969, the two undertook a $1 billion program to bolster and improve Iran's armed forces in preparation for the British
departure from the Persian Gulf."
There have been significant British arms sales activities elsewhere, notably in Latin America. Ships as well as aircraft have
been purchased by a number of nations in that region. Some of the
most important naval transactions are being completed over a period of years; thus their impact on British sales statistics for any
particular year is limited.
IV.

ARMS SALES TRENDS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Despite the regional variations, the three nations under consideration are similar in their overall arms sales activities. First, there
has been a lack of clearly defined policy interests motivating the
countries' arms sales, although there has not been a total absence
of attention to the issue of how arms bear on broader foreign policy
concerns, or how they might be used to influence the actions of

11.

1972 SIIPRI YEARBOOK, at 108.
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other nations. In the Middle East, all three, and most dramatically
the United States, have certainly employed arms aid as an important tool in the effort to influence events there. Under the direction
of Secretary Kissinger, the substantial amounts of arms aid made
available to both sides have been directly related to the goal of
increasing American leverage. Generally, however, military sales
in recent years have increased tremendously without overall control or clear connection to national policy goals.
In addition to the lack of concentrated national policy, there has
been an absence of international coordination among major armaments sellers. This communication gap is comparatively easy to
understand in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union,
longstanding competitors for influence, whose competition has
been somewhat dampened, but hardly eliminated, by the strategic
arms limitations agreements and technical collaboration under
what used to be labeled "detente." The lack of coordination between three formally allied nations such as Britain, France, and
the United States is much more difficult to understand. Limited
joint ventures such as the collaboration in arms assistance to Iran
show that the countries are capable of working together, but these
arrangements have not dominated. The three nations remain competitive and nationalistic.
This international situation indirectly encourages more aggressive and nationalistic sales policies. A common argument for engaging in the arms trade-one which has been influential in each
of the major countries under consideration-is that if one government does not take the orders another will." Since no efforts at
international coordination have been undertaken there is no way
of knowing whether such efforts would reduce the growth of the
enormously expanding arms sales traffic.
In addition to the practical, economic, and national considerations is the nuclear-strategic question. One of the suggested justifications for significant conventional arms shipments to other countries, particularly outside of Europe, is that they discourage recipient nations from developing nuclear capabilities. Since an increasingly large number of nations appear to be on the verge of acquir12. Senator Edward Kennedy, in a 1975 article in ForeignAffairs, made the
point that various considerations spur arms sales, including encouragement "as

a kind of last resort argument heard more in private than in public-by the belief
that if we don't sell arms to the Gulf countries, some other country will." Ken-

nedy, The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?, 54 FOREIGN AFFAm, Oct.
1975, at 18.

Winter 1977]

ARMS SALES

ing the technical capacity to develop and manufacture their own
nuclear weapons, this argument carries particular weight. Nevertheless, it is a difficult position to defend in light of available
empirical evidence. Substantial conventional military capabilities, achieved with considerable external aid and assistance, did
not prevent India from developing a nuclear device. Similarly, the
enormous size of China's land armies did not inhibit expansion
beyond the nuclear threshold. Israel is a leading example of a
nation that attained nuclear capability despite the purchase and
receipt of enormous quantities of outside military assistance as
direct aid, the bulk of it from the United States. It is an openly
stated assumption that the Israelis have nuclear weapons; at this
point the informed discussion of the subject centers around their
numbers and characteristics. Likewise, the Arab nations are restricted in the development of nuclear weapons by their lack of
technical expertise, rather than by any deterrent effect due to the
substantial conventional arms assistance they have received.
Another argument in support of arms sales is that such sales
provide influence to the country that makes the weapons available.
This justification is more defensible than the one concerning nuclear weapons. Arms assistance to the adversaries in the Middle
East was instrumental in Secretary Kissinger's efforts to achieve
a modicum of stability there. But in that region it has been necessary to resort to increasingly large-indeed enormous-arms assistance to obtain comparatively modest leverage over the contestants. Also, as noted earlier, a seller faces restrictions as well as
potential influence.
Global growth in the arms trade is not directly related to disciplined efforts to gain leverage over the foreign, or even military,
policies of other nations. The calculated use of arms aid is often
frustrated by the flood of arms being sent to other countries by the
United States, Britain, and France with no direct accounting to
policy considerations. As testimony in the recent special Senate
hearings on the arms traffic indicated, there is no clear United
States priority interest in using sales as a method for gaining influence over other nations. 3 Having clients may indeed be an effective way of exercising broader diplomatic influence; however, there
is no reason to believe that this is a major incentive for the United
States or other selling nations.
There are powerful objections to arms sales because of the im13.

See, e.g., testimony of Admiral Gene La Roegue, 1975 Hearings.
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pact of such sales on the recipients. It is far from clear that present
policies encourage stability, and they may well do the reverse.
Even if conventional weapons dampen the desire to manufacture
a nuclear capability-and there is no indication that they do-the
sophistication of the weapons now being made available to Third
World countries may encourage more dangerous and potentially
destructive conventional arms races. A supply of technically advanced systems is likely to create a demand for more.
Additionally, the sale of sophisticated weapons abroad, especially in the thoughtless and indiscriminate manner of recent
years, can seriously compromise the defense capabilities of the
selling nations. Such sales increase the likelihood that sophisticated and closely held information will become available to hostile
powers.' 4 Occasionally, defectors from NATO to Warsaw Pact
countries bring with them technical information of great importance. The Russian pilot who landed in Japan is only the most
recent example. Present practices make it far more likely that vital
information will be spread and controls will be lost.
Finally, despite the fact that large amounts of weapons are being
sold to both sides in the Middle East (Israel and the Arab states
have amassed enormous arsenals), there is no indication that this
has promoted regional stability by making them comparatively
secure. On the contrary, the fact that the two camps are so heavily
armed increases insecurity and virtually guarantees that another
Middle East war will be even more devastating than the last. Furthermore, some have argued that the technically advanced character of the weapons involved may make a preemptive first strike
more attractive because these weapons would be more likely to
eliminate a substantial portion of the opponent's military capacity.'15
14. As one witness stated during Senate hearings on the arms traffic: "I would
certainly hate to see an F-14 fly into an unfriendly country or to have an unfriendly regime take over in a country such as Iran where an F-14 could be
thoroughly examined. I believe we would lose a lot of our technological edge in
the process, and of course, the F-14 is not the only sophisticated system that is
in Iran at this time." 1975 Hearings, at 78 (testimony of Dale R. Tahtinen,
Assistant Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.).
15. See Rosen & Indyk, The Temptation to Pre-Empt in a Fifth Arab-Israeli
War, 20 ORBIS, Summer 1976, at 265-85.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Several important conclusions emerge from a consideration of
the attitudes and approaches of these three Atlantic Area nations
to the foreign arms sales. There is the dominant impression of a
uniformity among the countries, despite their foreign policy differences. All three have become increasingly active in the overseas
arms trade. The United States may overshadow the others, but
this seems to be due more to greater production and distribution
capacity than to any real differences in attitude. All three are not
only selling greater quantities of weapons, but they are tending
toward selling the most advanced conventional weapons systems
available.
The Atlantic nations have not developed clear arms sales policy
guidelines. Selling is essentially a passive activity. Legal rules have
not been formulated, policies have not been developed, and simple
economic forces operating on buyers and sellers have been allowed
to dominate. Economic incentives, not the specific national security goals which arms sales might further, exert the greatest influence. Specific deals designed to produce greater diplomatic influence over specific countries are powerfully overshadowed by the
more general arms trade that is not closely supervised. The ability
of buyers to bypass governments in certain areas reinforces this
pattern. While most sales in the three countries are handled
through public authorities, there are exceptions. In the United
States, the Pentagon usually acts as the agent of defense contractors in foreign military sales. Airliner sales, however, have been
handled directly between buyers and manufacturing companies, as
6
in the controversial Tristar sale to Japan."
With the general absence of direction over sales policies, there
has been a widespread lack of concern for the dangers to the international stability posed by the proliferation of conventional weaponry. The anxiety over the hazards of nuclear proliferation, especially to Third World countries, may have served to overshadow
the risks inherent in the spread of conventional rather than nuclear
weapons. The fact that more advanced and sophisticated conventional arms are being traded increases the chance that the traffic
will have destabilizing effects and encourage even more ambitious
acquisitions. Thus, the arguments against sales carry more force
than those offered in justification.
16.

Szulc, supra note 7, at 9.
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Finally, these observations may be related directly to the practices and institutions of the governments involved. None of the
countries under consideration has developed coherent, detailed,
and practical arms sales control policies. Nevertheless, the United
States has gone the farthest in examination by public institutions
of policy shortcomings in this field. As in other foreign policy areas,
Congress has recently become very assertive in evaluating 'nd
criticizing executive performance. Such prominent discussion has
not had parallels in France, where the President is unusually independent in foreign affairs, or in Britain where the executive and
legislature are fused rather than separated and the House of Commons generally lacks the substantive staff resources that are available to Congress. Once again, in this context, as in others, the
comparatively vigorous and independent character of the national
legislature in the United States is underlined."
In addition to the lack of strong internal coordination in the
governments involved, there has been a failure of international
coordination in arms sales. This is partly explained by the lack of
national policies and attention. Nonetheless, this appears to be a
particularly promising area for international linkage. The three
countries share a history of military and diplomatic cooperation on
security concerns dating back to the beginning of this century.
More importantly, all are allied militarily through NATO. An
effective collaboration of three of the four major sellers would substantially refute the argument that abstention by one only permits
another to receive the profits. There is a certain concreteness and
specificity to the arms trade which should facilitate and promote
cooperation among these nations. Arguably they have mutuality of
interest. Other economic issues, such as general trade and monetary questions, are more complex and contentious and can more
easily lead to competitive rather than cooperative attitudes. By
failing to develop an international partnership in arms sales policy,
the three countries have missed an important opportunity for a
possible increase in Atlantic area collaboration.
17. For a discussion of the comparative powers of the U.S. Congress vis-A-vis
other Western legislatures see Grosser, The Evolution of EuropeanParliaments,
in A NEw EUROPE (S. Graubard ed. 1967).

